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Abstract
We study a dynamic limit order market where agents may invest into a trading technology
that grants them a speed advantage over others. Being fast is valuable because it allows limit
orders to be revised quickly in the light of new information and therefore reduces the risk of being
picked o¤. Even though this can generate more trading, the equilibrium level of investment is
excessive and always generates a welfare loss because fast traders exert negative externalities on
slow agents and are able to extract any surplus. If the di¤usion of trading technology additionally
leads to a more e¢ cient trading process, this result may reverse completely. For su¢ ciently large
e¢ ciency gains, fast traders exert positive externalities on slow market participants and their
presence leads to an increase in social welfare, albeit the equilibrium level of investment is
below the social optimum. Our results imply that the marginal impact of investments related to
algorithmic and high-frequency trading on social welfare crucially depends on the pre-investment
level of market e¢ ciency.
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1 Introduction
While the proverb "time is money" applies to virtually all economic activities, the accelerated prolif-
eration of electronic trading has taken this wisdom to the extreme. High-frequency trading (HFT),
a variant of algorithmic trading, relies on sophisticated computer programs for the implementation
of trading strategies that involve a vast amount of orders in very small time intervals. Propietary
trading desks, hedge funds and so-called pure-play HFT outlets are investing large sums into human
(IT experts, mathematicians, linguists, etc.) and physical (co-location, data feeds and warehouses,
etc.) capital in an e¤ort to outpace the competition. Recent estimates suggest that HFTs are now
responsible for more than 50% of trading in U.S. equities.1
These developments are being accompanied by a heated debate among nancial economists,
practitioners, and regulators about the implications of an increasing computerization of the trading
process. While proponents2 argue that technology increases market e¢ ciency via improved liquidity
and price discovery, critiques3 claim that HFTs make prots at the expense of other (slow) market
participants and have the potential to destabilize markets.
This paper contributes to this debate by presenting a model of trading in a limit order market
where agents di¤er in the speed with which they can react to the arrival of new information, which
is thought to capture the di¤erence between (fast) HFTs and (slow) human market participants. We
build on the model of Foucault (1999), in which limit orders face the "winners curse" because they
cannot be revised after submission and thus may become stale due to the arrival of new information.
In this setting, an increase in the underlying assets risk induces agents to submit less aggressive limit
orders (sometimes referred to as "order shading") such that less gains from trade are realized. We
extend Foucaults model by allowing for the possibility that agents invest into a trading technology
that endows them with a relative speed advantage. Specically, we assume that fast traders (FTs)
face a reduced probability of being "picked o¤" (Copeland and Galai (1983)) because they have
the possibility to revise their limit orders after news releases, albeit only if the next agent is a slow
trader (ST).
We analyze the stationary equilibrium of this dynamic limit order market and compare it with
the baseline case of identical traders studied by Foucault (1999). Notice that because the choice
between limit and market orders in endogenous in this model, agents prots from either are closely
interrelated. In fact, the limit order market is nothing else but a sequential bargaining process,
where an agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (limit order) to the following agent, who either
accepts this o¤er (via a market order) or in turn makes another o¤er to the agent arriving after him.
1See Financial Times, High-frequency boom time hits slowdown, April 12, 2011.
2See e.g. Optiver, High Frequency Trading, Position Paper, 2011, http://fragmentation.dessa.com/wp-
content/uploads/High-Frequency-Trading-Optiver-Position-Paper.pdf
3See SEC Chairman Mary Schapiros speech in front of the Security Traders Association "Remarks Before the
Security Traders Association", www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch092210mls.htm.
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As a consequence, the expected prot obtained from posting a limit order acts as an endogenous
outside option that determines agentswillingness to accept a limit order or not. Now it is crucial
to understand that the decision of some agents to become fast does not only have a positive e¤ect
on their own outside option (because they avoid being picked o¤ if the next agent is slow) but also
a negative e¤ect on the outside option of those agents that remain slow. The latter e¤ect arises
because STs now need to adjust their strategy for the fact that some agents have become fast and
require better terms of trade in order to be convinced to accept a limit order. While they may
choose to i) incur either a reduced execution probability or ii) lower prots conditional on execution
(via more aggressive quotes), both reactions lead to strictly lower expected prots.
As the order choice is endogenous, this redistribution in "bargaining power" also a¤ects the dis-
tribution of expected prots from market orders (we call the inverse expected trading costs), and FTs
generally obtain better prices than STs. While situations may arise where STs face lower expected
trading costs than in the absense of FTs, this is entirely due to the increased aggressiveness of other
STs quotes, because FTs are able to price discriminate implicitly (if an order can be cancelled, the
next agent is slow with probability 1) between trader types due to their speed advantage.
In sum, STs are always worse o¤ in the presence of FTs compared to a market with only STs.
This has important implications for social welfare, as the equilibrium level of investment is such that
fast and slow agents obtain the same expected utility once the cost of becoming fast is accounted
for. Although FTsability to avoid the "winners curse" has the potential to increase the total gains
from trade that are realized, investment is excessive in equilibrium due to negative externalities and
yields a loss in social welfare.
In an extension we allow for the possibility that investments in trading technology do not only
give some agents an edge over others but also improve the overall e¢ ciency of the trading process
(e.g. because it facilitates the aggregation of dispersed trading information in a fragmented market).
More specically we assume that slow traders are a source of ine¢ ciency in the sense that there is
some positive probability 1   with which limit orders are "missed", i.e. the arriving agent submits
a market order although the best available limit order is such that he would accept it. FTs never
miss orders, such that their presence now also has a positive e¤ect on STsoutside option because
it increases the execution probability of limit orders. If the slow market is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient
(i.e. for low ), this e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ect of FTshigher limit order prots and the
equilibrium level of investment may lead to an increase in social welfare albeit falling short of the
social optimum (due to positive externalities).
Our results have important implications for policy makers as they suggest that the impact of
investments made by trading rms engaging in algorithmic and particularly high-frequency trading
on social welfare crucially depends on the e¢ ciency of the marketplace prior to these investments.
Hence it is important to develop a broader view that jointly addresses both the benets as well as
the potential concerns related to the ongoing transformation of the market structure. Certainly,
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the widespread automatization of the trading process has brought along numerous benets as it has
facilitated liquidity provision via electronic market making and inter-market competition via smart
oder routing systems. On the other hand, the HFT community is spending vast sums with the sole
aim to outpace the competition, while the resulting gains for overall market e¢ ciency are likely to
be marginal. Given that there is scope for intervention from either side (taxes or subsidies), the
real-world implementation of adequate policies is likely to face measurement problems.
The literature on algorithmic and high-frequency trading has grown substantially in the past
couple of years (see e.g. the surveys by Biais and Woolley (2012) and Focuault (2012)). Most
closely related to our paper are the two recent papers by Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) and Biais
et al. (2012). The rst paper studies competitive middlemen that intermediate between early limit
order traders and late market order traders. As in this study, HFTsspeed advantage may reduce
order shading by updating quotes quickly and therefore increase trade. On the other hand, they
o¤er another explanation for why HFT may also reduce trade (unawareness of information by STs
when submitting market orders). A calibration exercise reveals a slight increase in welfare. The
main di¤erence between this paper and theirs is that they assume FTs to be competitive and act
as pure intermediaries, while we allow for some degree of market power and do not consider pure
intermediation. Moreover, we additionally consider the social cost of investments into technology
when evaluating welfare. In Biais et al. (2011), investing into trading technology helps to reap gains
from trade by facilitating the search for trading opportunities, but at the same time increases adverse
selection for slow market participants. This negative externality (and the associated overinvestment
in equilibrium) is very similar to the one arising in our model, but it is based on reduced-form
assumptions instead of arising from speed in connection with the trading protocol. Moreover, because
they consider a dealer market, STs cannot benet from the gains in e¢ ciency brought about by
investments into trading technology. Also closely related, Cartea and Penalva (2011) propose a
model where their increased speed allows HFT to impose a haircut on liquidity traders, which
increases trading volume and price volatility, but lowers the welfare of liquidity traders.
Several studies empirically examine the impact of algorithmic and high-frequency trading on
market quality. In summary, this stream of the literature concludes that automated trading strategies
improve liquidity (Hendershott et al. (2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2011)), are highly protable
(e.g. Brogaard (2010) and Menkveld (2011)), and signicantly contribute to price discovery (e.g.
Hendershott and Riordan (2011a, 2011b)). In line with our ndings on the e¤ects of speed in a
limit order market, Hendershott and Riordan (2011a) nd that algorithmic traders "supply liquidity
when it is expensive and consume liquidity when it is cheap". Moallemi and Saµglam (2011) provide
some empirical estimates of the "cost of latency" and nd a dramatic increase between 1995 and
2005. Chaboud et al. (2009)) study computer- and human-generated order ow in the FX market
and conclude that the trading strategies by automated traders are more correlated among each other
than those of human market participants (see also Brogaard (2010)). Kirilenko et al. (2011) examine
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the recent ash crashin U.S. equity markets and nd that HFT may have exacerbated volatility
during this brief liquidity crisis, although they are not to blame for the crash itself. In contrast, the
results in Brogaard (2011) do not conrm the concerns that HFT activity leads to an increase in
volatility. While most empirical studies have only analyzed U.S. data (exceptions are Chaboud et
al. (2009) and Hendershott and Riordan (2011a)), Boehmer et al. (2012) examine a sample of 39
exchanges around the world. In sum, they conrm the view that algorithmic trading has a positive
e¤ect on liqudity and price e¢ ciency, but also nd that it increases volatility (this e¤ect is not due
to improved price e¢ ciency).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an outline of the model, whose solution
is presented subsequently in Section 3. An analysis of trading prots and the order ow compo-
sition follows in Section 4, while we endogenize the proportion of fast traders and examine social
welfare in Section 5. The extended model with e¢ ciency gains due to investments into trading
technology is presented in Section 6. Finally, a numerical solution with normally distributed inno-
vations is contained in Section 7, followed by the conclusion. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A,
while Appendices B and C contain tables and gures for the closed-form and numerical solution,
respectively.
2 The model
2.1 The limit order market
We consider an innite-horizon4 version of Foucaults (1999) dynamic limit order market. There is
a single risky asset whose fundamental value follows a random walk, i.e.
vt = vt 1 + "t
where the innovations can take values of   0 and   with equal probability and are independent
over time. Trading takes place sequentially at time points t = 1; 2; : : : and the order size is xed at
one unit. In this model, trading arises due to di¤erences in private values. Specically, we assume
that at time t0, the reservation price of a trader arriving at time t  t0 is given by
Rt0 = vt0 + yt
which is the sum of the assets fundamental value and the time-invariant private valuation yt.
We assume that this private valuation can take two values yh = +L and yl =  L with equal
4This assumption is merely for convenience as it simplies the algebra. Foucault (1999) assumes that the terminal
date is stochastic, as the trading process stops after each period with constant probability 1    > 0. An innite
horizon may be interpreted as the limiting case where ! 1.
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probability, where L > 0. The ys are independent and identically distributed across traders, and
moreover independent from the asset value innovations. All traders are risk-neutral and maximize
their expected utility. The utility obtained by an agent purchasing or selling the asset is given by
U(yt) = (vt0 + yt   Pt0)qt0
where t0  t denotes the time of the transaction, Pt0 is the transaction price, and qt0 is a trade
direction indicator that takes the value of +1 for buy transactions and  1 for sell transactions. The
utility of an agent that does not trade is assumed to be equal to zero.
Trading is organized as a limit order market. Consider a buyer (i.e. an agent with private
valuation yh). Upon his arrival, he can either a) submit a market buy order or b) submit a buy
limit order for one unit of the asset.5 We assume that he decides to submit a limit order if he is
indi¤erent between both choices. Similarly, sellers choose between market and limit sell orders. All
limit orders are valid for one period, i.e. they expire unless being executed by the following agent.
Besides their private valuations agents may also di¤er in their type t, which is determined by
the trading technology available to them. For simplicity, we assume that technology is solely related
to speed, such that agents are either fast traders (t = FT ) or slow traders (t = ST ). Let  2 [0; 1]
denote the proportion of fast traders (henceforth FTs, slow traders are abbreviated as STs). We
assume that each trader may choose to become fast at a cost c before entering the market and
learning his private valuation yt. As it is customary in the literature (see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), we rst compute the equilibrium taking  as exogenous (and independent of " and y) and
then pin down its equilibrium value by equating the utilities of fast and slow traders.
Unless limit orders are monitored perfectly (Foucault, Röell and Sandås (2003) and Liu (2009)
study the cost of monitoring limit orders), the arrival of new information may render them stale and
thereby grant a free option to other market participants (Copeland and Galai (1983)). Clearly, the
ability to react faster than others is very valuable as it reduces this risk of being "picked o¤". In
order to model this e¤ect in the most parsimonious way we assume that FTs can revise (or update)
their limit orders after the arrival of new information (i.e. the realization of "t+1) yet before the
arrival of the next agent, but only provided he is a ST. If the next trader is a FT as well, the order
cannot be revised. STs can never cancel their orders. Notice that for both  = 0 and  = 1 our
model collapses to the model of Foucault (1999), where limit orders can never be revised once they
are submitted. Hence speed only matters in relative terms, that is being fast is is only an advantage
as long as there is someone else that is slow. This assumption (which will be relaxed at a later stage)
is quite natural given that our focus is on the winners curse problem in a limit order market.
5Foucault (1999) assumes that traders always submit a buy and sell limit order, which is without loss of generality
as limit prices can always be chosen such that limit orders have a zero execution probability. In fact, in equilibrium,
the ask (bid) quotes of buyers (sellers) are never executed, such that we directly assume that buyers (sellers) only
submit buy (sell) limit orders.
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Let st = (Bmt ; A
m
t ) denote the best bid and ask quote in the market. If there is no bid (ask)
quote posted, we write Bmt =  1 (Amt = 1). Upon entering the market, a trader learns his type
t and private valuation yt, and observes the state of the limit order book st as well as the current
fundamental value of the asset vt. Call St = (st; vt) the state of the market.
2.2 Payo¤s
Consider a buyer that arrives at time t when the state of the market is St. If he chooses to submit
a buy market order (which executes at the best available ask price), his payo¤ is equal to
U b;MOt;k (A
m
t ) = vt + L Amt k 2 fST; FTg (1)
Instead, he can choose to submit a buy limit order. The expected payo¤ of a slow buyer submitting
a buy limit order with bid price Bt;ST is given by
E(U b;LOt;ST (Bt;ST )) = p
b
t(Bt;ST )(vt + EEx["t+1] + L Bt;ST ) (2)
where pbt(Bt;ST ) denotes the execution probability of a buy limit order with bid price Bt;ST and
EEx () is an expectation conditional on the execution of the respective limit order. Given that a
FT may revise his limit order in case the next arriving trader is a ST, a fast buyer that decides to
use a limit order chooses three di¤erent bid prices, (Bt;FT ; B
+
t;FT ; B
 
t;FT )), and his payo¤ is given by
E(U b;LOt;FT (Bt;FT ; B
+
t;FT ; B
 
t;FT ) = p
b
t(Bt;FT jt+1 = 1)(vt + EEx["t+1jt+1 = 1] + L Bt;FT ) (3)
+ (1  )1
2
pbt(B
+
t;FT jt+1 = 0; "t+1 = +)(vt +  + L B+t;FT )
+ (1  )1
2
pbt(B
 
t;FT jt+1 = 0; "t+1 =  )(vt    + L B t;FT )
where the pbt(jt+1; "t+1) denote execution probabilities conditional on the realization of next pe-
riods trader type and asset value innovation. Similarly, a seller submitting a sell market order
obtains
Us;MOt;k (B
m
t ) = B
m
t   (vt   L) k 2 fST; FTg (4)
while the expected payo¤s for STs and FTs from posting sell limit orders with ask prices equal to
At;ST and (At;FT ; A
+
t;FT ; A
 
t;FT ) , respectively, are given by
E(Us;LOt;ST (At;ST )) = p
s
t (At;ST )(At;ST   (vt + EEx["t+1]  L)) (5)
and
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E(Us;LOt;FT (At;FT ; A
+
t;FT ; A
 
t;FT ) = p
s
t (At;FT jt+1 = 1)(At;FT   (vt + EEx["t+1jt+1 = 1]  L)) (6)
+ (1  )1
2
pst (A
+
t;FT jt+1 = 0; "t+1 = +)(A+t;FT   (vt +    L))
+ (1  )1
2
pst (A
 
t;FT jt+1 = 0; ; "t+1 =  )(A t;FT   (vt      L))
2.3 Equilibrium Denition
Let Bt;ST denote the optimal bid price chosen by a slow buyer that decides to place at limit or-
der at time t. Thus, upon arrival, a slow buyer chooses between a) a buy market order at ask
price Amt and b) a buy limit order with bid price B

t;ST . We call his choice the slow buyers or-
der placement strategy ObST (St) 2

bmt ; B

t;ST
	
where bmt denotes a market buy order at time t.
Similarly, let (Bt;FT ; B
 
t;FT ; B
+
t;FT ) be the optimal bid prices for a fast buyer that opts for limit
orders when arriving at time t. He then chooses between a) a buy market order at ask price
Amt and b) a buy limit order with bid price B

t;FT , which, unless the next agent is a FT, is re-
vised to B+t;AT (B
 
t;AT ) after the arrival of positive (negative) fundamental information. Hence,
ObFT (St) 2
n
bmt ; (B

t;FT ; B
 
t;FT ; B
+
t;FT )
o
. The choices of slow and fast sellers are completely sym-
metric, i.e. they choose between a) a market sell at Bmt and b) limit sell orders with ask prices
equal to At;ST and (A

t;FT ; A
 
t;FT ; A
+
t;FT ), respectively, such that their order placement strategies
are OsST (St) 2

smt ; A

t;ST
	
and OsFT (St) 2
n
smt ; (A

t;FT ; A
 
t;FT ; A
+
t;FT )
o
, where smt denotes a market
sell. As in Foucault (1999) and Colliard and Foucault (2012 ), we focus on stationary Markov-perfect
equilibria, which is natural because traders prots do not depend on the history of the game but
only on the state of the market upon their arrival.
Denition 1 A Markov-perfect equilibrium of the limit order market consists of order placement
strategies ObST (), OsST (), ObFT () and OsFT () such that, for each possible state of the market St, i)
ObST (St) (O
b
FT (St)) maximizes the expected utility of a slow (fast) buyer arriving in state St if all
other traders follow the strategies ObST (), OsST (), ObFT () and OsFT () and ii) OsST (St) (OsFT (St))
maximizes the expected utility of a slow (fast) seller arriving in state St if all other traders follow
the strategies ObST (), OsST (), ObFT () and OsFT ().
Foucault (1999) shows that it is possible to characterize traders optimal decisions by means
of cuto¤ prices that depend on a traders private valuation and the current fundamental value of
the asset. The buy (sell) cuto¤ price is the highest (lowest) ask (bid) price at which an arriving
buyer (seller) submits a market buy (sell) order instead of a buy (sell) limit order. Let V LOST (yt) and
V LOFT (yt) denote equilibrium expected prots from posting limit orders for STs and FTs, respectively,
that is
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V LOST (yt) 
(
E(U b;LOt;ST (B

t;ST )) if yt = yh
E(Us;LOt;ST (A

t;ST )) if yt = yl
(7)
V LOFT (yt) 
(
E(U b;LOt;FT (B

t;FT ; B
 
t;FT ; B
+
t;FT )) if yt = yh
E(Us;LOt;FT (A

t;FT ; A
 
t;FT ; A
+
t;FT )) if yt = yl
(8)
Then, the equilibrium buy and sell cuto¤ prices are given by
CsST (vt; yt)  (vt + yt) = V LOST (yt) (9)
CsFT (vt; yt)  (vt + yt) = V LOFT (yt) (10)
(vt + yt)  CbST (vt; yt) = V LOST (yt) (11)
(vt + yt)  CbFT (vt; yt) = V LOFT (yt) (12)
Intuitively, the limit order market can be interpreted as a sequential bargaining process, where a
limit order trader makes a take-it or leave-it o¤er to the next arriving agent, who in turn may either
accept this o¤er or decide to post a new o¤er to the following agent. Therefore, the expected prots
from submitting limit orders e¤ectively constitute an endogenous outside option (the prots when
not accepting the available o¤er) that determine a reservation price (the cuto¤ price). The above
system of equations can be solved for the equilibrium cuto¤ prices, which in turn give rise to traders
equilibrium quotation strategy.
3 Equilibrium
For ease of exposition, we will in the following always assume that the limit order trader is a "buyer"
(with private valuation yh) and the market order trader is a "seller" (with private valuation yl). This
is without loss of generality because the symmetric arguments apply to limit order sellers and market
order buyers. It is easy to see that it is never optimal for a limit order buyer to target another buyer,
because both agents will value the asset at vt +L when transacting at time t such that there are no
gains from trade to be shared. Moreover, in understanding the construction of the equilibrium, it is
crucial to notice that any optimal bid price must be such that it is marginally above some sellers
cuto¤ price for a particular realization of the asset value innovation "t+1. Clearly, a slight increase in
the bid price does not lead to a higher execution probability, while a small decrease in the bid price
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leads to a strictly lower execution probability. In the following, we will abuse notation by equating
equilibrium quotes to cuto¤ prices as in Foucault (1999), because they can be made arbitrarily close.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, FTsrevised bid quotes are given by
B t;FT = C
s
ST (vt   ; L) B+t;FT = CsST (vt + ; L)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Due to their speed advantage, FTs may re-price their limit orders after observing the change
in the fundamental value in case the next arriving agent is a ST. In essence, this enables FTs to
discriminate between FTs and STs, because the former face the initial quotes while the latter face
the updated quotes. Hence the updated quotes are e¤ectively set in the knowledge of both of "t+1
and t+1, such that the optimally revised bid price is just equal to the cuto¤ sell price of a slow
seller given the fundamental asset value vt+1. Consequently, FTsdecision boils down to choosing
between initial quotes (which are only aimed at FTs) with a high ll rate and a low ll rate.6 One
the other hand, STs may employ four di¤erent quotation strategies in equilibrium, which reects
that their quotes always face both FTs and STs.
Lemma 2 Let  2 (0; 1). Then
i) CsFT (vt; L) > CsST (vt; L)
ii) CsST (vt;+L) > C
s
FT (vt; L)
iii) CsST (vt + ; L) > CsFT (vt   ; L)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Unsurprisingly, fast sellers have a higher sell cuto¤ price because their endogenous outside option
of posting limit orders is more valuable due to the ability of revising limit orders. Parts b) and c)
of the Lemma state that there this advantage, which we henceforth denote   CsFT (vt; L)  
CsST (vt; L), is naturally limited both by the gains from trade and the risk of being picked o¤. We
are now ready to determine the equilibrium quotation strategies.
Proposition 1 For xed parameters (; ; L), there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in
the limit order market. The type of equilibrium is as follows.
Type 1: If   1 and   1, then
6A fast buyer may either post a bid price equal to CsFT (vt   ; L), which only executes after a decrease in the
asset value (low ll rate), or a bid price equal to CsFT (vt + ; L), which may execute both after an increase or a
decrease of the asset value (high ll rate).
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Bt;FT = C
s
FT (vt   ; L) Bt;ST = CsST (vt   ; L)
Type 2: If 1 <   2 and   4 or 2 <  and   5, then
Bt;FT = C
s
FT (vt   ; L) Bt;ST = CsFT (vt   ; L)
Type 3: If   1 and 3   < 1 or 1 <   2 and 3   < 4, then
Bt;FT = C
s
FT (vt   ; L) Bt;ST = CsST (vt + ; L)
Type 4: If   2 and 2   < 3, then
Bt;FT = C
s
FT (vt + ; L) Bt;ST = CsST (vt + ; L)
Type 5: If   2 and  < 2 or 2 <  and  < 5, then
Bt;FT = C
s
FT (vt + ; L) Bt;ST = CsFT (vt + ; L)
The variables 1, 

2, 

1, 

2, 

3, 

4, 

5 are dened in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the following, we briey describe the di¤erent equilibria, focusing on the type of limit orders
chosen by slow and fast limit order sellers. Figure 1 in Appendix B graphically depicts the regions in
the (; )-space that correspond to the di¤erent equilibria, where we have set L = 1 (this is without
loss of generality as only the ratio of  and L is relevant).
Type 1: In the type-1 equilibrium, the limit orders posted by slow buyers are only executed by
slow sellers in the case of a decrease in the fundamental asset value. The execution probability of
such of such an order is (1   )=4. Fast buyers follow a low ll rate strategy, i.e. they initially set
the bid price slightly above CsFT (vt   ; L), such that the order is executed if the next agent is
a fast seller and the asset value has decreased. If the next agent turns out to be a ST, the FT is
able to revise the bid price according to the latest realization in the asset value process and posts a
bid price that is equal to a slow sellers cuto¤ price, i.e. either CsST (vt   ; L) or CsST (vt + ; L)
depending on the realization of "t+1 (see Lemma 1). The execution probability of this quotation
strategy is (2  )=4.
Type 2: In this type of equilibrium, slow buyers that post limit orders choose the bid price such
that the order is executed if the next agent is either a slow or a fast seller and the asset value has
decreased, such that these orders have an execution probability of 1=4. Fast buyers behave as in the
type-1 equilibrium.
Type 3: Here, slow buyers submit buy limit orders with a bid price slightly above the sell cuto¤
price of a slow seller after an asset value increase, that is Bt;ST = C
s
ST (vt + ; L). Such orders are
executed if a) the next arriving agent is slow seller independently of the asset value innovation, or b)
11
the next trader is a fast seller and the asset value has decreased, and their equilibrium probability
of execution is equal to (2  )=4. Fast buyers behave as in the type-1 equilibrium.
Type 4: In the type-4 equilibrium, slow buyers behave as in the type-3 equilibrium. Fast buyers
employ a high ll rate strategy, i.e. they initially post a bid price slightly above CsFT (vt + ; L),
and then revise it according to Lemma 1 if the next agent turns out to be a ST. The execution
probability of this quotation strategy is equal to 1=2.
Type 5: Slow buyers that opt for a limit order choose a bid price such that the order is executed
if the next agent is a seller, such that their orders have an execution probability of 1=2. Fast buyers
behave as in a type-4 equilibrium.
The e¤ect of FTs speed advantage on limit order prots is understood best by looking at the
type-3 equilibrium, where the quotation strategies of both types of agents have the same execution
probability of (2 )=4. Nevertheless, STslimit orders always execute at Bt;ST = CsST (vt+; L),
while FTslimit orders may also execute at CsST (vt   ; L) < Bt;ST or CsFT (vt   ; L) < Bt;ST ,
which implies higher expected prots due to the avoidance of picking-o¤ risks and the ability to
price discriminate between FTs and STs.
The main goal of our analysis is to examine how trading technology a¤ects equilibrium out-
comes such as the composition of order ow, trading prots, and welfare. This basically amounts
to comparing the outcome for some level of  2 (0; 1) with the case where all traders are slow.
Unfortunately, the fact that " is assumed to be both discrete and bounded (which is necessary to
obtain a closed-form solution) complicates this endeavour slightly as it leads to bang-bang solutions
where a slight change in parameters can lead to a jump from one extreme (low trade) outcome to
another (high trade). Hence we will frequently make the following assumption on .
Assumption 1  2  = 1 \ 2, where 1 = [0; 2(2)) and 2 = [1(1);1).
Intuitively, this assumption means that that  is not "too close" to the tipping point 1(0) of the
original Foucault (1999) model (at this point, agents are indi¤erent between following a low ll rate
and a high lle rate quotation strategy with execution probabilities of 1=4 and 1=2, respectively),
which allows us to reap the benets of having a closed-form solution while minimizing the potential
distortions due to bang-bang type solutions. The range for values of  that is excluded under
Assumption 1 is indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 1 (Appendix B). In Section 7 we provide
the results of a numerical solution where " follows a normal distribution. The obtained results are
virtually identical to those derived in closed form under the above assumption.
In the following sections, we will frequently provide plots of equilibrium outcomes as functions of
 for the purpose of illustration. Notice that for a xed level of , di¤erent values of  may give rise
to di¤erent equilibria and for  2 1 the exact values of  for which we move from one equilibrium
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to another additionally depend on  itself. For 0   < 3(0), we may end up in a type-4 or a
type-5 equilibrium, and for 3(0)   < 2(2) a type-3, type-4 or a type-5 equilibrium may arise.
Therefore, we choose ^1 = 3(0)=2 and ^2 = (

2(

2)   3(0))=2 as representative levels of  for
illustration purposes. Because for  2 2 the equilibrium outcomes do not depend on  we simply
set ^3 = 1.
4 Trading prots and the composition of order ow
4.1 Limit order Prots
By denition, the equilibrium cuto¤ prices are the endogenous reservation prices that represent the
outside option of posting limit orders. While Lemma 2 implies that V LOFT > V
LO
ST (suppressing the
yt), we can make a stronger statement by relating each trader types limit order prots to those
obtained by agents in the absence of fast traders, V LO0 .
Proposition 2 Let  2 (0; 1). Then, V LOFT > V LO0 > V LOST .
Proof. See the Appendix.
In any equilibrium with a positive fraction of FTs, STsexpected prots from posting limit orders
are lower than in the absence of FTs. Intuitively, there are two ways in which STs can respond to the
arrival of FTs with a higher outside option ( > 0). They can either i) increase the aggressiveness of
their limit orders or ii) incur a decreased order execution probability (i.e. they decide to post quotes
that are not (always) executed by FTs). It is immediate that the rst reaction always harms STs
expected prots from limit orders, as they simply o¤er better quotes, but the execution probability
of these orders is as in the case where  = 0. On the other hand, choosing ii) allows STs to post
less aggressive quotes than in the absence of FTs, as the outside option of other STs has su¤ered
(V LOST < V
LO
0 ). Nevertheless, the e¤ect of a reduced execution probability dominates, such that
their expected prots are also lower in this case. For illustration, Figure 2 in Appendix B depicts
V LOFT ,V
LO
ST and 
 as functions of  for  = ^l, where l = 1; 2; 3.
4.2 Order ow composition
We next turn to the analysis of the order ow composition, i.e. the equilibrium mix between limit and
market orders. On the equilibrium path, four events (actions) are possible. The arriving agent can
be 1) a ST submitting a limit order, 2) a ST submitting a market order, 3) a FT submitting a limit
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order, or 4) a FT submitting a market order. Now let 'i = ('i1; '
i
2; '
i
3; '
i
4) denote the stationary
probability distribution of the above market events in a type-i equilibrium, where i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g.
As in Colliard and Foucault (2012), we call the probability of a randomly arriving investor submitting
a market (limit) order the trading (make) rate, which are given by
TRi = 'i2 + '
i
4 (13)
MRi = 'i1 + '
i
3 = 1  TRi (14)
Similarly, we can calculate the trading and make rates for ST and FT separately as
TRiST = '
i
2=('
i
1 + '
i
2) (15)
MRiST = '
i
1=('
i
1 + '
i
2) = 1  TRiST (16)
TRiFT = '
i
4=('
i
3 + '
i
4) (17)
MRiFT = '
i
4=('
i
3 + '
i
4) = 1  TRiFT (18)
Let TR, TRST and TR

FT denote the equilibrium trading rates (e.g. TR
 = TR1 if   1 and
  1), and let TR0 be the equilibrium trading rate when all traders are slow.
Proposition 3 TRST  TR  TRFT for all  2 (0; 1). Now assume that  2 .
i) If  2 2, then TRST > TR > TR0 > TRFT for all  2 (0; 1).
ii) If  2 1, then TRST  TR0  TR  TRFT for all  2 (0; 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In equilibrium, STs are more likely to use market orders than FTs because they are more likely to
encounter a quote they nd worth accepting when arriving at the market. This follows directly from
FTshigher endogenous outside option, which may diminish the aggressiveness of STs limit order
such that they sometimes only "target" STs for a given realization of the asset value innovation.
To understand the results on the overall trading rate, it is important to understand that the
introduction of FTs has two opposing e¤ects. First, FTsspeed advantage reduces their risk of being
picked o¤ and thereby the need for order shading, which leads to an increase in trading volume.
Second, it may be optimal for STs to post less aggressive limit orders because FTs advantage  is
too high, which implies more order shading and therefore implies a decrease in trading volume.
If  2 2, the rst e¤ect dominates. Absent FTs ( = 0), slow buyers submit limit orders that
only execute in case the asset value decreases (increases), i.e. trading volume is low because the risk
of being picked o¤ is too severe. Now, the introduction of FTs leads to more trade as their ability
of updating quotes quickly after the arrival of new information allows transactions to occur after
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price increases as well. On the other hand, the rst e¤ect is absent for  2 1, because there is no
order shading when  = 0 (because " is bounded, it is possible to set e.g. a bid price that any seller
will nd worth executing, independent of the realization "). Hence the presence of FTs leads to a
decrease in trading volume because it is optimal for STs to post less aggressive limit orders for a
low level of . Once the proportion of FTs is su¢ ciently high, this e¤ect also disappears, and the
level of trading volume is as in the slow market.
Our results regarding trading volume are very similar to those found in Jovanovic and Menkveld
(2010) in the sense that the introduction of FTs may lead both to an increase or a decrease in
trading volume. In fact, both our and their paper suggest that the increased speed of FTs may
reduce order shading because their quotes can reect new fundamental information instantaneously.
Nevertheless, the reason for a possibly lower trading activity in their paper (unawareness of hard
information by STs when submitting market orders) di¤ers considerably from the mechanism at
work in this model (a higher endogenous outside option of FTs induces STs to post less aggressive
orders). Other literature rather assumes that the presence of FTs increases trading volume, either via
intermediation (Cartea and Penalva (2011) or due to more e¤ective search for trading opportunities
(Biais et al. (2012)).
For illustration, Figure 3 in Appendix B depicts TRST , TR

FT and TR
 as functions of  for
 = ^l, where l = 1; 2; 3.
4.3 Trading costs
Let VMOk denote the equilibrium expected prot from posting a market order for a trader with type
k 2 fST; FTg. We can then write
VMOk = L  E(k)
where E(k) is the expected trading cost in equilibrium, i.e. the average premium paid above the
assets true value. For example, a sellers utility derived from submitting a market order is given by
equation (4), such that his trading cost is equal to
 t = vt  Bmt
It is important to note that the best available bid crucially depends on the type of both the market
order trader and the limit order trader whose quote is executed. This is due to the assumption that
FTs may revise their quotes, but only in the case the agent arriving after him is a ST. Additionally,
the trading cost also depends on the most recent realization of the fundamental asset value due to
the picking o¤ risk faced by the limit order trader. Let  t;j;k denote the trading cost for a type-j
seller that arrives at time t and submits a sell market order that executes against a buy limit order
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posted by a type-k buyer at time t  1, where j; k 2 fST; FTg. In particular, consider a slow seller
who arrives at time t and submits a sell market order that executes against the best available bid.
If the bid stems from a ST, the trading cost is given by
+t;ST;ST = vt 1 +   Bt 1;ST (19)
for "t = + and
 t;ST;ST = vt 1     Bt 1;ST (20)
for "t =  . In case the best available bid was posted by a fast buyer (and therefore was revised
before the arrival of the market order trader), the trading cost is given by
+t;ST;FT = vt 1 +   B+t 1;FT (21)
for "t = + and
 t;ST;FT = vt 1     B t 1;FT (22)
for "t =  . In order to calculate the expected trading costs, we simply have to weight the trading
costs for each possible event by its stationary probability. Let +j;k (
 
j;k ) denote the equilibrium
probability that the asset value increases (decreases) and subsequently a buy limit order posted by a
type-k trader is executed by a sell market order from a type-j trader, where j; k 2 fST; FTg. Then
the equilibrium expected trading cost of the slow seller is given by7
E(ST ) =
'1(
+
ST;ST 
+
ST;ST + 
 
ST;ST 
 
ST;ST ) + '

3(
+
ST;FT 
+
ST;FT + 
 
ST;FT 
 
ST;FT )
'1(
+
ST;ST + 
 
ST;ST ) + '

3(
+
ST;FT + 
 
ST;FT )
(23)
Following exactly the same logic, the expressions for the trading costs of fast sellers are given by
+t;FT;ST = vt 1 +   Bt 1;ST (24)
 t;FT;ST = vt 1     Bt 1;ST (25)
+t;FT;FT = vt 1 +   Bt 1;FT (26)
 t;FT;FT = vt 1     Bt 1;FT (27)
and their equilibrium expected trading costs are given by
E(FT ) =
'1(
+
FT;ST 
+
FT;ST + 
 
FT;ST 
 
FT;ST ) + '

3(
+
FT;FT 
+
FT;FT + 
 
FT;FT 
 
FT;FT )
'1(
+
FT;ST + 
 
FT;ST ) + '

3(
+
FT;FT + 
 
FT;FT )
(28)
Then the average expected trading cost in equilibrium is given by
E() =
TRST
TRST + TR

FT
E(ST ) +
TRFT
TRST + TR

FT
E(FT ) (29)
Dening E(0) as the equilibrium average expected trading cost in the slow market, we obtain the
following.
7Notice that we may omit the time subscripts due to stationarity.
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Proposition 4 E(ST ) > E(
) > E(FT ) for all  2 (0; 1). Now assume that  2 . Then
i) E(FT ) < E(

0) for all  2 (0; 1).
ii) For every , there exists some 1 such that E(

ST ) > E(
) > E(0) for all  < 
1
 .
iii) For every  2 2 and every  < 2(1=4), there exists some interval (2 ; 3 ) such that
E() < E(ST ) < E(

0) for all  2 (2 ; 3 ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind the fact that FTs enjoy lower expected trading costs than STs is straight-
forward. Because they are slow, STs miss prots due to picking o¤ stale limit orders, as some of
them stem from fast traders and therefore have been set in the knowledge of the latest asset value
innovation. Additionally, this e¤ect is amplied by the fact that FTs quotation strategies discrimi-
nate between FTs and STs such that the latter do not prot from more attractive quotes targeted
at FTs (who have a higher cuto¤ sell price).
There is ample empirical evidence that supports the view that being slow leads to trading at less
favourable prices. Garvey and Wu (2010) document that geographical distance to the market center
is negatively related to execution speed and positively related to transactions costs. Hasbrouck &
Saar (2009) show that the "lifetimes" of limit orders have decreased considerably over the last years,
suggesting that a large proportion of quotes are in fact not accessible for slower market participants.
Hendershott and Riordan (2011a) study algorithmic trading on the German Stock Exchange and
nd that "algorithmic traders consume liquidity when it is cheap", i.e. they pay lower e¤ective
spreads than human traders. Consistent with this, Moallemi and Saglam (2011) develop a model of
the "cost of latency" and estimate that it has increased threefold in the period 1995-2005. In fact,
some exchanges have e¤ectively supported implicit price discrimination via speed by introducing
so-called "ash orders" (see Skjeltorp et al. (2011) for details), a practice that has been banned in
the meantime.
While the fact that E(FT ) < E(

0) is not very surprising (FTs large outside option implies that
attractive quotes are needed to convince them to submit market orders), the relationship between
the presence of FTs and E(ST ) (and hence also E(
)) is somewhat more complex. For simplicity,
consider the case where  2 2, such that only a type-1 or a type-2 equilibrium may arise. If  = 0,
the equilibrium bid price is set such that a buy limit order is only executed in case the next agent is a
seller and the asset value has decreased in between trader arrivals. In other words, the risk of being
picked o¤ is su¢ ciently high to induce order shading by limit order traders. Now consider what
happens if we introduce a small proportion of FTs (  1). Given that  is small, it is optimal for
STs to submit buy limit orders that are only executed by other STs, but not by FTs ( is relatively
large for small  as FTslimit orders can only be picked o¤ by other FTs). Because V LOST < V
LO
0
(see Proposition 2), STs post lower bid prices as in the absence of FTs and thus E(ST ) > E(

0).
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Now consider what happens if we increase  further. Once we have  > 1, it becomes optimal
for STs to post buy limit orders that are also executed by fast sellers in the case of a price decrease.
This happens for two reasons. First, a higher level of  leads to a considerable increase in the
execution probability of limit orders if they are also targeted at FTs. Second, FTs exert a negative
externality on each others limit order prots by increasing the picking o¤ risk (note that FTs may
not cancel their limit orders if the next trader is also a FT), such that it becomes "cheaper" for STs
to target them. But because STs now post more aggressive limit orders, the expected trading costs
of other STs decrease below E(0), as we have V
LO
FT > V
LO
0 for all  2 (0; 1). As  approaches
unity, this e¤ect diminishes as V LOFT ! V LO0 and because STs are less and less likely to nd a
quote submitted by another ST (FTs can discriminate between STs and FTs, o¤ering worse quotes
to the former). It is important to notice that FTs do not contribute to an eventual decrease in STs
expected trading costs.
In principle, this intuition also applies to the case where  2 1. Nevertheless, in this case there
is no order shading without FTs (i.e. limit orders have an execution probability of 1=2) and therefore
market orders may benet if the asset value moves against the limit order trader. Because they are
slow, STs no longer obtain these additional prots when facing limit orders from FTs because those
are already incorporating the latest asset value innovation. Therefore, the more aggressive quoting
behaviour by STs for intermediate values of  will only lead to E(ST ) < E(

0) as long as  is
su¢ ciently low ( < 2(1=4)). Otherwise the reduction in picking o¤ prots will dominate and
trading costs are higher than absent FTs.
For illustration, Figure 4 in Appendix B depicts E(ST ), E(

FT ) and E(
) as functions of 
for  = ^l, where l = 1; 2; 3.
While we nd that expected trading costs may both increase or decrease in the presence of
fast traders, the empirical evidence suggests a rather one-sided picture. Several studies (see e.g.
Hendershott et al. (2011), Boehmer et al. (2012), and Hasbrouck and Saar (2012)) nd that
algorithmic trading is associated with an improvement in market liquidity in the sense of lower
quoted and the e¤ective spreads. Some of these studies also suggest that the e¤ect is causal. While
it is possible to reconcile these ndings with our model, some caution is warranted. Most importantly,
our measure of trading costs merely reects the distribution of bargaining power between limit and
market order traders, which is not necessarily in line with the more traditional notion of the "cost
of immediacy" payable to an intermediary. In fact, trading costs can be negative in our model (as
e.g. in Goettler et al. (2009)) because we may have Bmt > vt, while most empirical measures assume
that the midquote is equal to the true value and hence Bmt < vt by assumption.
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5 Equilibrium investment in trading technology and social
welfare
We next turn to the equilibrium determination of the proportion of fast traders and the analysis of
social welfare. As mentioned in Section 2, we assume that all agents are born slow but may choose
to become fast prior to the trading game at a cost c > 0. Now let W ST () and W

FT () denote the
equilibrium expected trading prots for slow and fast traders respectively (given some proportion
).8 Then, an interior equilibrium requires that the prots of slow traders are equal to those of fast
traders net of the cost for becoming fast, that is
W () W FT () W ST () = c (30)
On the other hand, corner equilibria may arise either because the cost c is prohibitively high, i.e.
max

W () < c (31)
in which case all agents choose to remain slow,  = 0, or because the incremental benet of
being fast is high enough to justify the cost for any level of  (hence  = 1), which is the case i¤
min

W () > c (32)
Equipped with the results from the previous sections, it is straightforward to calculate the ex-
pected equilibrium trading prots for both types of agents as
W ST =
'1
'1 + '

2
V LOST +
'2
'1 + '

2
VMOST (33)
W FT =
'3
'3 + '

4
V LOFT +
'4
'3 + '

4
VMOFT (34)
Then, emphasizing the dependence of all equilibrium outcomes on , equilibrium social welfare
is given by
W () = (1  )W ST () + (W FT ()  c) (35)
= TR() (2L)  c
In Figure 5 (Appendix B) we plot W ST (), W

FT () and W
() for  = ^l, where l = 1; 2; 3.
Note that an equilibrium may fail to exist because W () is not continuous in . Furthermore,
an interior equilibrium need not be unique because there may be more than one value of  that
satises W () = c for xed (; L; c). In any case, given our previous results we can conclude the
following.
8Notice that the results from the previous sections trivially imply that W () > 0 for all .
19
Proposition 5 Suppose that the parameters (; L; c) are such that an equilibrium with endogenous
investment in trading technology exists and  2 . Then any positive equilibrium level of investment
 > 0 exceeds the socially optimal level of investment + and moreover yields a social welfare loss,
that is we have W () < W (0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
From a social welfare point of view it is clearly ine¢ cient that all agents become fast because
W (1) = W (0)   c < W (0). Moreover, it directly follows from Proposition 3 that an interior
equilibrium can never be e¢ cient for  2 1 because in this case TR < TR0. It turns out that
although TR > TR0 for  2 2, the potential increase in gains from trade is never su¢ cient to
cover the social cost of investment in technology. This occurs because fast agents do not internalize
their negative impact on slow traders, such that given the socially optimal investment level + there
are still incentives for slow agents to become fast. While this negative externality is very similar in
spirit to that in Biais et al. (2012), it is based on considerably weaker assumptions. Moreover, as
we will see in the next section, a simple extension may reverse this result.
6 Technology with e¢ ciency gains
In this section we entertain the possibility that an investment in technology does not only give
agents an edge over others but also contributes to a more e¢ cient trading process. To this end we
generalize our framework and suppose that slow traders are a potential source of ine¢ ciency. In
particular, we assume that if a slow seller arrives and the limit order book contains an order that
he would nd worthwile executing (i.e. he nds a bid price that exceeds his sell cuto¤ price), he
misses this trading opportunity with probability (1   ), where  2 (0; 1] is the e¢ ciency of the
"slow" market. Because fast traders never miss a limit order, an increase in  improves the average
e¢ ciency of traders  = (1   ) + . While our assumption is very stilized, it is quite realistic.
For example, automation may help reaping gains from trade by facilitating the consolidation of
dispersed trading information in a fragmented market such as the US or European equity markets.
Although the algebra is quite cumbersome, it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium of the
extended model because it su¢ ces to adjust the execution probabilities accordingly. For example,
the expected utilities of slow and fast limit order buyers (equations (2) and (3)) now become
E(U b;LOt;ST (Bt;ST )) = p
b
t(Bt;ST )(vt + EEx["t+1] + L Bt;ST ) (36)
and
20
E(U b;LOt;FT (Bt;FT ; B
+
t;FT ) = p
b
t(Bt;FT jt+1 = 1)(vt + EEx["t+1jt+1 = 1] + L Bt;FT )
+ (1  ) 1
2
pbt(B
+
t;FT jt+1 = 0; "t+1 = +)(vt +  + L B+t;FT )
+ (1  ) 1
2
pbt(B
 
t;FT jt+1 = 0; "t+1 =  )(vt    + L B t;FT ) (37)
Proposition 6 For xed parameters (; ; L; ), there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium
in the limit order market.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is important to notice that we obtain the same equilibria as before (in terms of quotation
strategies), just with di¤erent cuto¤ prices and execution probabilities. Figure 6 in Appendix B
plots the partitioning of the (; )-space for di¤erent values of  (we set L = 1 as before). Notice
that as that  decreases, the range that gives rise to the type-1, type-3 and type-4 equilibria shrinks.
This is quite intuitive, because it becomes less and less attractive to only target slow traders as they
are the source of the ine¢ ciency.
Given the equilibrium cuto¤ prices and quotation strategies, it is straightforward to compute the
equilibrium order ow composition, trading costs, and welfare. It is easy to see that the presence of
fast traders may now potentially improve social welfare if the "slow" market is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient.
While slow traders are still negatively a¤fected by FTsbetter outside option, this e¤ect can be
overcompensated by an increase in the execution probability of their limit orders (the lower , the
larger this e¤ect), such that we may have V LOST > V
LO
0 . Then, increased limit order prots for
STs additionally imply an increased "bargaining power" for market orders and therefore also lower
trading costs E(ST ) < E(

0). Hence we have the following.
Proposition 7 Fix (; L) and some positive level of equilibrium investment  > 0. Then, there
exist parameters (; c) with  < 1 such that W () > W (0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition states that we can always nd a su¢ ciently low level of  such that the equilib-
rium investment in technology yields an increase in social welfare (naturally we require that c is such
that this equilibrium exists). Notice that we cannot make the stronger statement that there is some
level ~ such that any equilibrium with endogenous investment will always result in a social welfare
gain for all  < ~. This is owed to our assumption that " is bounded. To see this, let  2 2, such
that there always exists some small  (< 1) that gives rise to a type-1 equilibrium. In this type
of equilibrium it is optimal for STs to submit limit orders that are never executed by FTs, which
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implies that STs do not benet from the e¢ ciency gains and su¤er a welfare loss as V LOST < V
LO
0
and E(ST ) > E(

0). As  converges to zero, this e¤ect disappears because 

1 ! 0. Figure 7 in
Appendix B plots W ST , W

FT and W
() for di¤erent values of  and  = ^l, where l = 1; 3.9
Because the presence of fast traders increases the e¢ ciency of the trading process via allowing
more gains from trade to be realized, investment in technology may now in fact exhibit positive
externalities. This implies that the result from the previous section may reverse and we can obtain
underinvestment in equilibrium. To see this, consider the following numerical example. Assume
that  = L = 1 and c = 0:1. Then the following table provides the (unique) equilibrium level of
investment  and the optimal level of investment + together with the associated levels of social
welfare. For comparison, we also provide social welfare for  = 0. Notice that under the chosen
parameter conguration there always exists some positive level of  that leads to an increase in
social welfare because we have TR > TR0.
  + W () W (+) W (0)
1:00 0:759 0:347 0:383 0:446 0:400
0:75 0:691 0:507 0:358 0:407 0:316
0:50 0:549 0:616 0:311 0:391 0:222
0:25 0:125 0:683 0:157 0:381 0:118
It is easy to see that we move from excessive investment ( > +) to underinvestment ( < +)
as  decreases. Although Biais et al. (2012) also assume that investment in trading technology may
bring e¢ ciency gains, their setting does not allow for positive externalities because they consider a
dealer market and assume that fast traders are more likely to "nd" a dealer (i.e. trading opportu-
nity). This di¤erence suggests that the trading protocol may have an important impact on the way
technology a¤ects welfare. Our results are consistent with the observation that algorithmic trading
is particularly prevalent in those markets where the limit order market is the dominant trading
protocol.
In conclusion, the overall e¤ect of trading technology on welfare crucially depends on whether its
sole purpose is to outpace other market participants or instead also contributes to an improvement
in the e¤ectiveness of the marketplace. In general, the equilibrium level of investment will di¤er from
the social optimum, such there is room for policy intervention such as taxes (for overinvestment) or
subsidies (for underinvestment) on expenditures for trading technology.
9The reason why we do not plot the graph for  = ^2 is that this parameter value does not give rise to the same
equilibrium combinations for all  (which is the case for ^1 and ^3, see Figure 6). Recall from Section 3 that the ^l
were chosen under Assumption 1, whose purpose is to avoid a "jump" from a low-trade to a high-trade equilibrium.
Notice that one would have to adjust Assumption 1 for  < 1 because the parameter regions that give rise to a specic
equilibrium now also depend on .
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7 Robustness: Normally distributed innovations
While assuming that " 2 f; g has allowed us to solve for the equilibrium cuto¤ prices and
quotation strategies in closed form, the resulting bang-bang type solutions complicate the analysis
of equilibrium outcomes as small variations in  may induce a jump from on extreme strategy to
another. Also, the fact that " is bounded means that in some occasions limit orders cannot be stale
as they already condition on a "worst case scenario". In order to minimize the complications arising
from discontinuities we have frequently evoked Assumption 1 and e¤ectively excluded a specic
parameter range for . In order to verify that this strategy has achieved the desired e¤ect without
leading us to draw wrong or incomplete conclusions, we here alternatively assume that " follows
a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation . Let F"() denote the associated
distribution function.
Now suppose the equilibrium quotation strategy of a slow buyer arriving at time t is to post a bid
price of Bt;ST . Given the denition of a cuto¤ sell price, a slow seller that arrives one period later will
opt for a market order i¤ Bt;ST  CsST (vt+1; L). Given our distributional assumption regarding
"t+1, there exists some "SS such that B

t;ST = C
s
ST (vt+"

SS ; L), which implies that pbt(Bt;ST jt+1 =
0) = F"("

SS)=2. Similarly, there exists some "

SF such that B

t;ST = C
s
FT (vt + "

SF ; L) and hence
pbt(B

t;ST jt+1 = 1) = F"("SF )=2. It is easy to see that we then must have  = "SS "SF > 0 (notice
that parts i) and ii) of Lemma 2 are still valid). Symmetry between buyers and sellers implies that
a slow traders expected limit order prots in equilibrium satisfy
CsST (vt; L)  (v   L) =
(1  )
2
F"("

SS)(vt + E["t+1j"t+1  "SS ] + L  CsST (vt + "SS ; L)) (38)
+

2
F"("

SS   )(vt + E["t+1j"t+1  "SS   ] + L  CsST (vt + "SS ; L))
which yields the following equilibrium limit order prot function
V LOST = C
s
ST (vt; L)  (vt   L) = max
"
pST (")
1 + pST (")
[2L+ASST (")] (39)
whereASST (") =
(1 )
2 F"(")E["t+1 "j"t+1"]+2 F"(" )E["t+1 "j"t+1" ]
pST (")
and pST (") =
(1 )F"(")+F"(" )
2 .
Similarly, suppose that the equilibrium quotation strategy of fast traders is to post bid prices
(Bt;FT ; B
+
t;FT ). Then, there exists some "

FF such that B

t;ST = C
s
FT (vt+"

FF ; L) and consequently
pbt(B

t;FT jt+1 = 1) = F"("FF )=2. From Lemma 1 (which is also still valid), it is immediate that
pbt(B
+
t;FT jt+1 = 0) = 1=2. Using CsST (vt; L) = CsFT (vt; L)  , we have
CsFT (vt; L)  (v   L) =
(1  )
2
(vt + L  CsFT (vt; L) + ) (40)
+

2
F"("

FF )(vt + E["t+1j"t+1  "FF ] + L  CsFT (vt + "FF ; L))
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which implies
V LOFT = C
s
FT (vt; L)  (vt   L) = max
"
pFT (")
1 + pFT (")
[2L+ASFT (")] (41)
where ASFT (") =
(1 )
2 
+2 F"(")E["t+1 "j"t+1"]
pFT (")
and pFT (") =
(1 )+F"(")
2 .
While the model does not admit a closed-form solution under the new distributional assumption,
it is easy to show that an equilibrium always exists10 . The procedure to compute the equilibrium
numerically is as follows. First, we start with some initial guess 0 and numerically maximize the
prot functions V LOk . This yields a new estimate 

1 = V
LO
FT (

0)   V LOST (0), which then is used
again in the maximization procedure. We continue iterating this relationship until the distancet   t 1 satises some formal convergence criterion. As it is customary, we employ a wide range
of di¤erent starting values to ensure that our maximization procedure nds the global optimum.
We always nd a unique equilibrium. As before, we normalize L = 1 and compute the equilibrium
for several values of  over the entire range of . Incorporating the extension of Section 6 is
straightforward, as it su¢ ces to modify equations (39) and (41) by replacing the terms (1   ) by
(1  ) everywhere.
Figures 1-5 in Appendix C plot the equivalents to Figures 2-6 of Appendix B, where we x L = 1
as before end employ three di¤erent values for  (0.05, 1, and 5). For the sake of parsimony, we just
state the results that relate to Propositions 3-5 and 7. Notice that it is straightforward to prove
analytically that V LOFT > V
LO
0 > V
LO
ST for all  2 (0; 1) when " is normally distributed.
Numerical Results
a) TRST > TR

0 > TR

FT for all  2 (0; 1).
b) There exists some threshold ^ such that TR > TR0 for all  > ^ and  2 (0; 1).
c) E(ST ) > E(
) > E(0) > E(

FT ) for all  2 (0; 1).
d) W ST () < W
(0) for all  2 (0; 1) and thus W () < W (0) for  > 0. Equilibrium
investment is excessive.
e) For a xed level of  > 0 there exist thresholds ;  2 [0; 1] with  <  such that we have
W () > W (0) (W () < W (0)) for  <  ( > ).
10Notice that the AS(")k are continuous and strictly decreasing in ", with lim
"! 1AS(")k = 0 and lim"!1AS(")k =
 1. Hence the exists some nite " such that V LOk > 0. Moreover, notice that  = V LOFT ()   V LOST () with
 2 [0; L] such that Brouwers xed point theorem implies the existence of an equilibrium.
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Points a) and b) closely mirror the results in Proposition 3: the presence of FTs increases the
likelihood that STs submit market orders and leads to an increase in overall trading volume for a
su¢ ciently high level of , while we may observe a lower trading volume for low . Notice from
Figure 2 in Appendix C that even for a low level of  we have TR > TR0 for  su¢ ciently large
in the case of " being normally distributed. This occurs because there is always some order shading
as " is unbounded, such that once there is a su¢ cient proportion of FTs the reduction in order
shading will always lead to an increase in trading volume. For the same reason, STs are always
missing out on some picking o¤ prots when trading against FTslimit orders as it is not possible
to condition on a "worst case scenario" where limit orders cannot become stale. Point c) states that
this e¤ect is always strong enough to o¤set potentially more aggressive quotes by other STs (also
see the discussion following Proposition 4). Hence the presence of fast traders always increases the
average and STsexpected trading costs, that is E(ST ) > E(
) > E(0), which is not always the
case for the closed-form solution as shown in Proposition 4. Notice that a departure from the arms
race assumption  = 1 can readily generate E(ST ) < E(
) < E(0), which is more in line with
the empirical evidence cited in Section 4.3. Finally, points d) and e) are the continuous equivalents
of Propositions 5 and 7 and thus do not require further commenting. Overall, the results obtained
from solving the model numerically are qualitatively almost identical to those obtained in closed
form under Assumption 1, in particular for the main results regarding the e¤ect of investments in
trading technology and social welfare.
8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ongoing controversy on the pros and cons of the increasing automation
of the trading process, in particular in relation to the enourmous growth in algorithmic and high-
frequency trading during the past decade. We show that a pure arms race where technology only
helps to outpace other market participants leads to a welfare loss. Although trade may increase,
the equilibrium level of investment is excessive from a social welfare perspective as slow traders are
exposed to negative externalities. This result may reverse completely if technology additionally helps
to improve the overall level of market e¢ ciency (e.g by aggregating dispersed trading information
in a fragmented market). Su¢ ciently large e¢ ciency gains may lead to an increase in social welfare
even though the equilibrium level of investment may fall short of the social optimum. In either case,
welfare may be improved by policy intervention via taxes or subsidies on technology investments.
In sum, our model relates simultaneously to the widespread concern that speed advantages are
being used to extract rents from slower market participants as well as to the main argument put forth
by HFT supporters that technology helps to improve market e¢ ciency. Our results suggest that
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there is a trade-o¤between both e¤ects, and the direction into which the pendulum ultimately swings
is determined by the pre-investment level of market e¢ ciency. While it is hard to deny that todays
electronic markets are more e¢ cient than the dealer markets of the past, it has become equally
demanding to term further reductions in latency with anything else but an arms race with little or
no gain for society as a whole. Given that there is scope for intervention from either side (taxes or
subsidies), the implementation of adequate policies crucially hinges on the correct evaluation of the
current level of market e¢ ciency, a task that is likely to be complicated by measurement problems.
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9 Appendix A: Proofs
9.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a fast buyer that has placed a bid at time t. If he observes the innovation "t+1 and can
still modify his order, he knows that the next agent (provided he is a seller) is a ST with sell cuto¤
price CsST (vt + "t+1; L). Clearly, the optimal bid price is slightly above this cuto¤ price, as a
lower (higher) bid has a zero (the same) execution probability. A symmetric argument holds for fast
sellers. 
9.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We prove only the statements for sell cuto¤ prices. Symmetry then establishes the corresponding
arguments for buy cuto¤ prices.
a) Suppose that, in equilibrium, a slow buyer posts a buy limit order that executes only if the asset
value decreases. Then, a fast trader can always do better by posting the same bid price and revise his
order according to Lemma 1 in case the asset value increases and the next trader is a ST. Similarly,
if a slow buyer posts a limit order that executes irrespectively of the asset value innovation, a fast
trader can do better by revising his order according to Lemma 1 and obtaining higher prots by
incorporating the latest innovation into his limit price whenever possible (i.e. when a slow seller
follows). Hence we conclude that CsFT (vt; L) > CsST (vt; L).
b) By denition, we have Csk (vt; yt)  (vt + yt) = V LOk (yt) for k 2 fST; FTg and yt 2 f L;+Lg.
As the execution probability of any limit order is no greater than 1=2, we have L  V LOk (yt)  0,
which implies vt+yt+L  Csk (vt; yt)  vt+yt. Hence we can write vt+2L  CsST (vt;+L)  vt+L
and vt  CsFT (vt; L)  vt   L, which establishes the result.
c) First, suppose that that   L=2. From the previous step, we know that vt+  CsST (vt+; L) 
vt +    L and vt     CsFT (vt   ; L)  vt      L, which directly implies CsST (vt + ; L) 
CsFT (vt   ; L). Now assume that  < L=2 and consider a fast buyers decision regarding his
quotation strategy. He will opt for a high ll rate in equilibrium i¤ 4 [v +L CsFT (vt+; L)]+

4 [v +  +L CsFT (vt + ; L)]  4 [v    +L CsFT (vt   ; L)], which is satised in our case as
v  +L  v+   CsFT (vt + ; L). Now consider a slow buyer and suppose he posts a buy limit
order with bid price equal to CsFT (vt + ; L). As this is not necessarily his equilibrium strategy
we have that V LOST (yh)  12 [v + L   CsFT (vt + ; L)]. But we just concluded that V LOFT (yh) =

2 [v+L CsFT (vt +; L)] + 1 4 [v +L CsST (vt ; L)] + 1 4 [v++L CsST (vt +; L)],
and therefore V LOFT (yh)   V LOST (yh)  1 4 [CsFT (vt + ; L)   CsST (vt   ; L)] + 1 4 [CsFT (vt +
; L)  CsST (vt + ; L)] = 1 2 [CsFT (vt; L)  CsST (vt; L)] + 1 2 . Symmetry between buyers
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and seller implies V LOFT (yh)   V LOST (yh) = CsFT (vt; L)   CsST (vt; L), such that we conclude
CsFT (vt; L) CsST (vt; L)  1 1+, which nally leads us to CsST (vt +; L) CsFT (vt ; L) =
CsST (vt; L)  CsFT (vt; L) + 2 > 0 as desired. 
9.3 Proof of Proposition 1
For each type of equilibrium, the proof procedes in three steps:
1) Conjecture an ordering of cuto¤ prices.
2) Conjecture equilibrium strategies and solve for the equilibrium cuto¤ prices.
3) Verify that
a) the assumed strategies are best replies (i.e. deviations are not protable) and
b) the cuto¤ prices satisfy the assumed ordering.
Lemma 2 implies that it su¢ ces to consider the following four orderings of cuto¤ prices.
Ordering 1: CsST (vt   ; L)  CsFT (vt   ; L)  CsST (vt   ;+L)  CsFT (vt   ;+L) 
CsST (vt + ; L)  CsFT (vt + ; L)  CsST (vt + ;+L)  CsFT (vt + ;+L)
Ordering 2: CsST (vt   ; L)  CsFT (vt   ; L)  CsST (vt   ;+L)  CsST (vt + ; L) 
CsFT (vt   ;+L)  CsFT (vt + ; L)  CsST (vt + ;+L)  CsFT (vt + ;+L)
Ordering 3: CsST (vt   ; L)  CsFT (vt   ; L)  CsST (vt + ; L)  CsST (vt   ;+L) 
CsFT (vt + ; L)  CsFT (vt   ;+L)  CsST (vt + ;+L)  CsFT (vt + ;+L)
Ordering 4: CsST (vt   ; L)  CsFT (vt   ; L)  CsST (vt + ; L)  CsFT (vt + ; L) 
CsST (vt   ;+L)  CsFT (vt   ;+L)  CsST (vt + ;+L)  CsFT (vt + ;+L)
For each ordering of sell cuto¤ prices, there is a corresponding ordering (due to symmetry) of
buy cuto¤ prices. For example, for Ordering 1, we have CbST (vt + ;+L)  CbFT (vt + ;+L) 
CbST (vt + ; L)  CbFT (vt + ; L)  CbST (vt   ;+L)  CbFT (vt   ;+L)  CbST (vt   ; L) 
CbFT (vt   ; L)
The following four tables contain the conditional and unconditional execution probabilities of buy
limit orders according to the position of the limit price relative to the cuto¤ sell prices, separately
for each employed ordering.
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Bid Price (Ordering 1) Execution Proba-
bility
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 =  
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 = +
 CsST (vt ; L) 0 0 0
2 (CsST (vt ; L); CsFT (vt ; L)] (1  )=4 (1  )=2 0
2 (CsFT (vt ; L); CsST (vt ;+L)] 1=4 1=2 0
2 (CsST (vt ;+L); CsFT (vt ;+L)] (2  )=4 (2  )=2 0
2 (CsFT (vt ;+L); CsST (vt+; L)] 1=2 1 0
2 (CsST (vt+; L); CsFT (vt+; L)] (3  )=4 1 (1  )=2
2 (CsFT (vt+; L); CsST (vt+;+L)] 3=4 1 1=2
2 (CsST (vt+;+L); CsFT (vt+;+L)] (4  )=4 1 (2  )=2
> CsFT (vt+;+L) 1 1 1
Bid Price (Ordering 2) Execution Proba-
bility
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 =  
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 = +
 CsST (vt ; L) 0 0 0
2 (CsST (vt ; L); CsFT (vt ; L)] (1  )=4 (1  )=2 0
2 (CsFT (vt ; L); CsST (vt ;+L)] 1=4 1=2 0
2 (CsST (vt ;+L); CsST (vt+; L)] (2  )=4 (2  )=2 0
2 (CsST (vt+; L); CsFT (vt ;+L)] (3  2)=4 (2  )=2 (1  )=2
2 (CsFT (vt ;+L); CsFT (vt+; L)] (3  )=4 1 (1  )=2
2 (CsFT (vt+; L); CsST (vt+;+L)] 3=4 1 1=2
2 (CsST (vt+;+L); CsFT (vt+;+L)] (4  )=4 1 (2  )=2
> CsFT (vt+;+L) 1 1 1
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Bid Price (Ordering 3) Execution Proba-
bility
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 =  
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 = +
 CsST (vt ; L) 0 0 0
2 (CsST (vt ; L); CsFT (vt ; L)] (1  )=4 (1  )=2 0
2 (CsFT (vt ; L); CsST (vt+; L)] 1=4 1=2 0
2 (CsST (vt+; L); CsST (vt ;+L)] (2  )=2 1=2 (1  )=2
2 (CsST (vt ;+L); CsFT (vt+; L)] (3  2)=4 (2  )=2 (1  )=2
2 (CsFT (vt+; L); CsFT (vt ;+L)] (3  )=4 (2  )=2 1=2
2 (CsFT (vt ;+L); CsST (vt+;+L)] 3=4 1 1=2
2 (CsST (vt+;+L); CsFT (vt+;+L)] (4  )=4 1 (2  )=2
> CsFT (vt+;+L) 1 1 1
Bid Price (Ordering 4) Execution Proba-
bility
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 =  
Execution Proba-
bility conditional
on "t+1 = +
 CsST (vt ; L) 0 0 0
2 (CsST (vt ; L); CsFT (vt ; L)] (1  )=4 (1  )=2 0
2 (CsFT (vt ; L); CsST (vt+; L)] 1=4 1=2 0
2 (CsST (vt+; L); CsFT (vt+; L)] (2  )=4 1=2 (1  )=2
2 (CsFT (vt+; L); CsST (vt ;+L)] 1=2 1=2 1=2
2 (CsST (vt ;+L); CsFT (vt ;+L)] (3  )=4 (2  )=2 1=2
2 (CsFT (vt ;+L); CsST (vt+;+L)] 3=4 1 1=2
2 (CsST (vt+;+L); CsFT (vt+;+L)] (4  )=4 1 (2  )=2
> CsFT (vt+;+L) 1 1 1
Type 1 equilibrium:
Let 1 = 4L=(5  ) and 1 =
p
5  2.
Case A:
Step 1: Assume Ordering 1.
Step 2: Conjecture the following equilibrium strategies: Slow buyers submit a buy limit order with a
bid price slightly above CsST (vt ; L), which has a probability of execution of (1 )=4 (see Table
A.1, Panel 1). Fast buyers submit a buy limit order with a bid price slightly above CsFT (vt ; L). If
the next trader is not a FT, they cancel this order after observing the innovation in the fundamental
value and set a new bid price slightly above CsST (vt   ;+L) (CsST (vt + ;+L)) if "t+1 =  
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("t+1 = +). The probability of execution for this strategy is (1 )=4+(1 )=4+=4 = (2 )=4
(see Table A.1, Panel 1). Moreover, conjecture the analogous strategies for slow and fast sellers, e.g.
a slow seller submits a sell limit order with ask price slightly below CbST (vt+;+L) with probability
of execution equal to (1 )=4. Thus, cuto¤ prices have to satisfy the following system of equations.
vt + L  CbST (vt;+L) =
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)]
CsST (vt; L)  (vt   L) =
1  
4

CbST (vt + ;+L)  (vt +    L)

vt + L  CbFT (vt;+L) =
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)]
+
1  
4
[vt +  + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
+

4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt   ; L)]
CsFT (vt; L)  (vt   L) =
1  
4

CbST (vt + ;+L)  (vt +    L)

+
1  
4

CbST (vt   ;+L)  (vt      L)

+

4

CbFT (vt + ;+L)  (vt +    L)

Straightforward algebra yields the following cuto¤ prices:
CsST (vt; L) = vt   L+ (2L)
1  
5  
CsFT (vt; L) = vt   L+ (2L)
8  (3 + )
(5  )(4 + )
CbST (vt;+L) = vt + L  (2L)
1  
5  
CbFT (vt;+L) = vt + L  (2L)
8  (3 + )
(5  )(4 + )
Step 3: Due to symmetry, it su¢ ces to analyze the strategies of buyers. As mentioned, the op-
timal bid price must be chosen such that it is slightly higher than the lower bound of any of the
proposed intervals, because a higher bid can be decreased without reducing the execution probabil-
ity. Moreover, it is easy to see that Ordering 1 implies that it is not optimal to post a bid price
B 2 (CsST (vt   ;+L),CsST (vt + ; L)]. Such a limit order is only executed in the case of a price
decrease, and therefore B > CsST (vt   ;+L)  vt    + L. But then, the execution of this limit
order cannot be protable, because the bid price is above the reservation price of the trader posting
the limit order. Moreover, it is clear that a bid price B > CsST (vt + ;+L)  vt +  + L cannot be
optimal, because it is higher the maximum valuation of any trader.11 Thus, the proposed strategy
11Using the same kind of reasoning, we can reduce the possible equilibrium bid prices for other orderings of cuto¤
prices as well.
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for slow buyers is a best reply i¤:
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
1
4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt   ; L)]
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
1
2
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
+
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
1
2
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
+
1
4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]
Similarly, fast buyers have no incentives to deviate i¤:

4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt   ; L)] 

2
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]
+

4
[vt +  + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]
Brute-force algebra reveals that these inequalities and the assumed ordering of cuto¤ prices are
satised if and only   1 and   24+(1 )(5 )(4+)L.
Case B:
Step 1: Assume Ordering 2.
Step 2: Conjecture the same equilibrium strategies as in Case A, which implies identical cuto¤
prices.
Step 3: The proposed strategies are best replies (for buyers) i¤
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
1
4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt   ; L)]
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
2  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
+
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
1
2
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
+
1
4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]

4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt   ; L)] 

2
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]
+

4
[vt +  + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]
These inequalities together with the conjectured ordering of cuto¤ prices are satised i¤   1 and
24+(1 )
(5 )(4+)L >   L.
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Case C:
Step 1: Assume Ordering 3.
Step 2: Conjecture the same equilibrium strategies as in Case A, which implies identical cuto¤
prices.
Step 3: The proposed strategies are best replies (for buyers) i¤
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
1
4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt   ; L)]
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
1
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
+
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
1  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt   ; L)] 
2  
4
[vt    + L  CsST (vt + ; L)]
+
1
4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]

4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt   ; L)] 

4
[vt    + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]
+

4
[vt +  + L  CsFT (vt + ; L)]
These inequalities together with the conjectured ordering of cuto¤ prices are satised i¤   1 and
L >   1. Combining Cases A, B and C, we conclude that the following quotation strategy and
the associated order choice strategy constitute an equilibrium i¤   1 and   1
Bt;HT = C
s
ST (vt   ; L) Bt;AT = CsFT (vt   ; L)
At;HT = C
b
ST (vt + ;+L) A

t;AT = C
b
FT (vt + ;+L)
The proof for the remaining equilibrium types follows exactly the same logic. In order to conserve
space, we will simply indicate the orderings that give rise to those equilibria and give the equilibrium
bid quotes in terms of the equilibrium cuto¤ prices.
Type 2 equilibrium: Orderings 1 4
Type 3 equilibrium: Orderings 3 and 4
Type 4 equilibrium: Ordering 4
Type 5 equilibrium: Ordering 4
The remaining cuto¤ variables are dened as
2 =
p
33 5
2 

2 = L
2(1+)
3 4 

3 = L
4(4+)
26 2 

4 = L
2(1 )(4+)
7+3
5 = L
4(1+)
7+3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The following table gives closed form solutions for the sellerssell cuto¤ prices in each type of equi-
librium.
Equilibrium Type CsST (vt; L) CsFT (vt; L)
1 vt L+ (2L) 1 5  vt L+ (2L) 8 (3+)(5 )(4+)
2 vt L+ (2L) 1+7+3 vt L+ (2L) 3 7+3
3 vt L+ (2L) 2 6   26  vt L+ (2L) 8 (2+)(6 )(4+)+ 4(1 )(6 )(4+)
4 vt L+ (2L) 2 6   26  vt L+ (2L) 4+(2 )(6 )(2+)+ 2 (8 )(6 )(2+)
5 vt L+ (2L) 13  23(1+) vt L+ (2L) 13+ 1 33(1+)
Finally, it is straightforward but tedious to verify that there exist no other equilibria. 
9.4 Proof of Proposition 2
It follows from equations (9) and (10) that V LOST = C
s
ST (vt; L) (vt L) and V LOFT = CsFT (vt; L) 
(vt L). Then V LOFT > V LOST is a direct consequence of Lemma 2. Moreover, we know from Foucault
(1999) that V LO0 = 2L=5 for   1(0) and V LO0 = (2L   )=3 for  < 1(0). Using the sell
cuto¤ prices obtained in the Proof of Proposition 1, it is straightforward to verify that we have
V LOFT > V
LO
0 > V
LO
ST for all  2 (0; 1). 
9.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For each type of equilibrium, the transitions from one state to another follow a Markov chain with
transition matrix P i; i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. We have
P 1 =
266664
3(1 )
4
1 
4  0
1   0  0
1 
2
1 
2  0
1   0  0
377775 P 2 =
266664
3(1 )
4
1 
4
3
4

4
1   0  0
1 
2
1 
2
3
4

4
1   0  0
377775
P 3 =
266664
1 
2
1 
2
3
4

4
1   0  0
1 
2
1 
2
3
4

4
1   0  0
377775 P 4 =
266664
1 
2
1 
2
3
4

4
1   0  0
1 
2
1 
2

2

2
1   0  0
377775
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P 5 =
266664
1 
2
1 
2

2

2
1   0  0
1 
2
1 
2

2

2
1   0  0
377775
Given these transition matrices, the stationary probability distribution 'i = ('i1; '
i
2; '
i
3; '
i
4) is given
by the left eigenvector associated with the unit eigenvalue. Straightforward calculations reveal
'1 = (
4(1  )(4  )
(4 + )(5  ) ;
(1  )(4 + 5  2)
(4 + )(5  ) ;
4
4 + 
;
2
4 + 
)
'2 = (
4(1  )(4  )
20  + 2 ;
(1  )(4 + 3+ 2)
20  + 2 ;
16
20  + 2 ;
(4  + 2)
20  + 2 )
'3 = (
(1  )(4  )
6   ;
2(1  )
6   ;
(5  )
6   ;

6   )
'4 = (
8(1  )
12 +   2 ;
(1  )(4 +   2)
12 +   2 ;
2(5  )
12 +   2 ;
(2 + 3  2)
12 +   2 )
'5 = (
2(1  )
3
;
1  
3
;
2
3
;

3
)
Using the denition of the trading rates in equations (13), (15) and (17), we obtain
TR1 = 4+(1 )(4+)(5 ) TR
1
ST =
4+(5 )
(4+)(5 ) TR
1
FT =

4+
TR2 = 4+3(1 )20 +2 TR
2
ST =
4+(3+)
20 +2 TR
2
FT =
4 (1 )
20 +2
TR3 = 2 6  TR
3
ST =
2
6  TR
3
FT =
1
6 
TR4 = 4 (1 )12+ 2 TR
4
ST =
4+(1 )
12+ 2 TR
4
FT =
2+(3 )
12+ 2
TR5 = 13 TR
5
ST =
1
3 TR
5
FT =
1
3
It is immediate that we have TRiST  TRiFT for all i, such that TRST  TRFT follows. Foucualt
(1999) shows that TR0 = 1=5 for  2 2 and TR0 = 1=3 for  2 1. If  2 2, a type-1
or a type-2 equilibrium may arise and it is straightforward to verify that in this case we have
TRiST > TR
i > 1=5 > TRiFT for all  2 (0; 1) and i = 1; 2. Similarly, if  2 1, a type-
3, type-4 and type-5 equilibrium may arise, and it is easy to check that in this case, we have
TRiST  1=3  TRi  TRiFT for all  2 (0; 1) and i = 3; 4; 5 as required. 
9.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Using the closed-form equilibrium quotes (see the proof of Proposition 1), it is straightforward to
calculate the trading costs for each combination of limit order trader and market order trader via
equations (19) - (22) and (24) (27). They are collected in the following table.
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Trading
Cost
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
S;+ST;ST n/a n/a
2+
6 L+
2
6 
2+
6 L+
2
6 
1
3L  1 33(1+)
S; ST;ST
3+
5 L
1+5
7+3L
2+
6 L  10 26   2+6 L  10 26   13L  7+33(1+)
S;+FT;ST n/a n/a n/a n/a
1
3L  1 33(1+)
S; FT;ST n/a
1+5
7+3L
2+
6 L  10 26   2+6 L  10 26   13L  7+33(1+)
S;+ST;FT
3+
5 L
5+
7+3L
2+
6 L+
2
6 
2+
6 L+
2
6 
1
3L+
2
3(1+)
S; ST;FT
3+
5 L
5+
7+3L
2+
6 L+
2
6 
2+
6 L+
2
6 
1
3L+
2
3(1+)
S;+FT;FT n/a n/a n/a
4+2
(6 )(2+)L  
2 (8 )
(6 )(2+)
1
3L  1 33(1+)
S; FT;FT
4+(7+)
(5 )(4+)L
1+5
7+3L
8+(6+)
(6 )(2+)L  
4(1 )
(6 )(2+)
4+2
(6 )(2+)L  
26 2
(6 )(2+)
1
3L  7+33(1+)
Then, the expected trading costs for ST and FT, respectively, are obtained by straightforward
substitution into equations (23) and (28). We obtain
E(1ST ) =
3+
5 L
E(1FT ) =
4+(7+)
(5 )(4+)L
E(2ST ) =
(4 )(1 )(1+5)+8(5+)
(7+3)((4 )(1 )+8) L
E(2FT ) =
1+5
7+3L
E(3ST ) =
2+
6 L+
2(5 ) (1 )(4 )2
4(6 ) 
E(3FT ) =
(1 )(4 )(4+)(2+)+(5 )(8+(6+))
(4+)(6 ) L+
2(5 )((4+)(4 )+2)
(4+)(6 ) 
E(4ST ) =
2+
6 L+
2(5 ) (1 )(4 )2
4(6 ) 
E(4FT ) =
8(1 )(2+)2+4(5 )(4+2)
(2+)(6 )(8+4(3 )) L+
2(5 )(8(1 )(2+)+(28 8)
(2+)(6 )(8+4(3 )) 
E(5ST ) =
1
3L  4 63(1+)
E(5FT ) =
1
3L  43(1+)
Average expected trading costs for each type of equilibrium can then be computed using equation
(29). It is easy to see that expected overall trading costs in the absence of AT are given by E(0) =
3L=5 for  2 2 and E(0) = (L   2)=3 for  2 1. It is easily veried that E( iST ) > E( i) >
E( iFT ) for all  2 (0; 1) and i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5:
i) For  2 2, the only equilibria that may arise are of type 1 or 2. It is straightforward to verify
that E( iST ) < 3L=5 for all  2 (0; 1) and i = 1; 2. Similarly, for  2 2 we are either in a type-3,
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type-4 or ype-5 equilibrium and we have E( iST ) < (L  2)=3 for all  2 (0; 1) and i = 3; 4; 5.
ii) Let  2 2. Then we are in a type-1 equilibrium for  < 1, and some algebra shows that
E(1ST ) > E(
1) > 3L=5. Similarly, for any  2 1 there exist some level of  such that a
type-3 or a type-4 equilibrium arises. Some cumbersome computations reveal that in this case
E( iST ) > E(
i) > (L  2)=3 for all  2 (0; 1) and i = 3; 4.
iii) It is tedious but straightforward to verify that E(2ST ) < 3L=5 i¤  <
7 p33
2 , from which the
result follows for  2 2 because 7 
p
33
2 > 

1 and we always have E(
i) < E( iST ). Similarly, it can
be veried that E(5ST ) < (L  2)=3 i¤  < 1=4, such that the results also obains for  < 2(1=4)
(notice that if   2(1=4), we do not have a type-5 equilibrium for  < 1=4). 
9.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Clearly we can never have + = 1 because W (1) = W (0)   c. Moreover, if  2 1 the socially
optimal level of investment is + = 0 because TR  TR0 for  2 (0; 1), such that any positive
level of investment implies a loss in welfare. Hence assume that  2 2. Notice that in this
case we have W (1) = 0 which implies that we must have  < 1. Thus consider an interior
equilibrium  2 (0; 1) and assume that + > 0 (otherwise  > + is trivial). By denition
@W()
@

=+
= 0 and W () = c. Now notice that the chain rule implies that @W
()
@ =
W () + (1   )@WST ()@ + @W

ST ()
@   c and it is easy (albeit very cumbersome) to verify that
(1 )@WST ()@ +@W

ST ()
@ < 0 for all , such that we conclude that W
(+) > c. Finally, because
for  2 2 we have @W
()
@ < 0 for all ; this implies 
 > +.
To show that W () < W (0) for  > 0 it su¢ ces to consider the case where  2 2 and  <
1. It is straightforward to verify that W (0) = 2L=5 > W ST =
'1
'1+'

2
V LOST +
'2
'1+'

2
(L   E(ST ))
by substituting the equilibrium expected prots from posting limit orders, stationary probability
distributions and trading costs from the Proofs of Propositions 1, 3 and 4 for the type-1 and type-2
equilibrium. 
9.8 Proof of Proposition 6
The Proof goes exactly as the one for Proposition 1 (notice that Lemma 1 and 2 still hold), except
that the execution probabilities of limit orders now need to be adjusted for the fact that slow traders
may miss trading opportunities. For example, a bid quote B = CsST (vt   ; L) is executed if a)
the next trader is a slow seller (probability (1 )=2), b) the asset value has decreased (probability
1=2) and c) the opportunity is not missed (probability ). Hence pbt(B) = (1   )=2. The cuto¤
values are given by
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1 = L
(1 )
4+(1 ) 

2 = L
2(2 (1 ))
((2+(1 )) 3) 

3 = L
4(4+)
16+8+2(1 )(+)+2
4 = L
2(1 )(4+)
(8+2 (1 )) 

5 = L
4(2 (1 a))
8+2 (1 ) 

1 =
p
4 (4 5)+(1 ) 2
(2 )
and 2 is dened implicitly by the intersection of 

2; 

3 and 

5.
The equilibrium sell cuto¤ prices can be written as Csk (vt; L) = vt   L + Lk (2L) + k for
k 2 fST; FTg, and the coe¢ cients are given by
Equilibrium
Type
LST 

ST 
L
FT 

FT
1 (1 )4+(1 ) 0
8(1 )+(4+(1 ))
(4+(1 ))(4+) 0
2 (2 (1 ))8+2 (1 ) 0
(1 )(4 )+2
8+2 (1 ) 0
3 2 4+2(1 )+   24+2(1 )+ (1 )(8+2)+(4+)(4+)(4+2(1 )+) 4(1 )(4+)(4+2(1 )+)
4 2 4+2(1 )+   24+2(1 )+ 4+(2 )(4+2(1 )+)(2+) 2(1 ) 4 2(1 ) 
2
(4+2(1 )+)(2+)
5 (2 (1 a))2(2+) (1 )   22(2+) (1 ) (2 (1 a))2(2+) (1 ) (1 ) 22(2+) (1 )

9.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Because there cannot be any trade if limit orders are never found we have lim
!0
W (0) = 0. Now notice
that for (; L) xed, the range of  that gives rise to a type-2 or a type-5 equilibrium approaches
the unit interval as  converges to zero because lim
!0
1 = 0 and lim
!0
2 = 0. For both types of
equilibrium we have lim
!0
V LOST > 0 (using the cuto¤ sell prices derived in the proof of Proposition
6) and hence lim
!0
W ST > 0 for all  > 0, such that the result follows immediately. 
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10 Appendix B: Figures
10.1 Figure 1: Equilibrium Map
This graph depicts the di¤erent regions in the (; )-space that give rise to the respective equilibria.
We have set L = 1. The are between the two dashed lines is the interval [2(

2); 

1(

1)).
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10.2 Figure 2: Equilibrium limit order prots and 
The gures in the left (right) column depict V LOST (blue) and V
LO
FT (red) (
) for di¤erent levels of
 (^3, ^2, and ^1 are dened in Section 3) as functions of .
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10.3 Figure 3: Trading Rates
The gures in the left (right) column depict TR (TRST (blue) and TR

FT (red)) for di¤erent levels
of  (^3, ^2, and ^1 are dened in Section 3) as functions of .
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10.4 Figure 4: Trading Costs
The gures in the left (right) column depict E() (E(ST ) (blue) and E(

FT ) (red)) for di¤erent
levels of  (^3, ^2, and ^1 are dened in Section 3) as functions of .
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10.5 Figure 5: Welfare
The gures in the left (right) column depict WF ST (blue) and WF

FT (red) (W
) for di¤erent
levels of  (^3, ^2, and ^1 are dened in Section 3) as functions of .
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10.6 Figure 6: Equilibrium Map for di¤erent values of 
This graph depicts the di¤erent regions in the (; )-space that give rise to the respective equilibria
for  = 1 (black),  = 0:75 (blue),  = 0:5 (red) and  = 0:25 (green). We have set L = 1.
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10.7 Figure 7: Welfare with e¢ ciency gains
These gures depict W ST , W

FT and W
 (from left to right column) as functions of  for di¤erent
values of  (^1 and ^3 dened in Section 3) and  ( = 1 (black),  = 0:75 (blue),  = 0:5 (red) and
 = 0:25 (green)).
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
a
W
*
W ST for  = ^1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
a
W
*
W ST for  = ^1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
a
D
W
*
W  for  = ^1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
a
W
*
W ST for  = ^3
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
a
W
*
W FT for  = ^3
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
a
D
W
*
W  for  = ^3
47
11 Appendix B: Figures
11.1 Figure 1: Equilibrium limit order prots and 
The gures in the left (right) column depict V LOST (blue) and V
LO
FT (red) (
) as functions of  for
 = 0:05,  = 1 and  = 5, respectively.
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11.2 Figure 2: Trading Rates
The gures in the left (right) column depict TR (TRST (blue) and TR

FT (red)) as functions of 
for  = 0:05,  = 1 and  = 5, respectively.
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11.3 Figure 3: Trading Costs
The gures in the left (right) column depict E() (E(ST ) (blue) and E(

FT ) (red)) as functions
of  for  = 0:05,  = 1 and  = 5, respectively.
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11.4 Figure 4: Welfare
The gures in the left (right) column depict WF ST (blue) and WF

FT (red) (W
) as functions of
 for  = 0:05,  = 1 and  = 5, respectively.
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11.5 Figure 5: Welfare with e¢ ciency gains
These gures depict W ST , W

FT and W
 (from left to right column) as functions of  for  = 0:05,
 = 1 and  = 5, respectively, and di¤erent values of  ( = 1 (black),  = 0:75 (blue),  = 0:5 (red)
and  = 0:25 (green)).
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